A few weeks ago at the APEC Summit, a familiar but confusing scene returned to global politics. US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, two leaders who are rewriting the rhythm of 21^st century geopolitics, shared a moment that seemed to restore the idea of a “G-2” world. Both countries quietly acknowledged each other as the ultimate arbiters of power.

It was the return of ‘Chimerica’- a term coined by historian Niall Ferguson in the late 2006 to describe the symbiotic economic relationship that had developed between the United States and China. It captured how the U.S and China became economically interdependent- America driving global consumption and China powering global production. This fusion, which gained momentum after China’s economic reforms and entry into global markets, sustained worldwide growth for decades. The U.S spent, China saved and both benefitted.

Well, it may describe their interdependent relationship but now it is a more complicated coexistence.

Just days before this diplomatic spectacle, Washington and New Delhi signed a new 10-year defence framework. The deal, covering cooperation across land, air, sea, space and cyber domains was presented as a major milestone in India-U.S ties. But beneath the optics lies a more sobering reality.

The arrangement looks like a strategic partnership and more like a buyer-seller relationship. As Trump extends a hand to Beijing while selling arms to India, it becomes clear that U.S isn’t choosing between its tow Asian priorities. It is simply keeping both in play, an act of pure diplomatic dexterity.

Today, Trump’s second presidency has revived the idea of Chimerica in a play with a harder edge. His approach toward Beijing is not one of warm cooperation but of “competitive coexistence.” His recent Asia tour spanning Japan, South Korea and ASEAN alongside his engagement with Xi, shows a shift from full confrontation to selective engagement. Washington is learning to live with China while limiting its rise.

For Asian nations, this renewed Chimerica brings as much unease as opportunity. America’s approach seems to oscillate between tariffs and handshakes, sanctions and summits.

Trump’s style may be unpredictable, but his method is consistent: deal with rivals from a position of strength, keep allies close but dependent and ensure that U.S remains the indispensable power in Asia.

India’s position becomes uniquely delicate. The new 10-year defence agreement gives New Delhi access to advanced technologies and greater interoperability with U.S forces. Yet, India must ask- is it truly a co-author of this security architecture, or merely a consumer of it?

A partnership built on purchases cannot define India’s long-term security ambitions. What New Delhi needs is capability-building, not dependency.

Moreover, as the U.S juggles its engagement with both China and India. Washington’s larger strategy appears clear- contain Beijing without losing Beijing. The goal is to maintain competition without escalation. In that balance, India becomes both a partner and a pawn.

This is where India’s own diplomacy must evolve. Instead of being trapped in the binary of the U.S-China contest, New Delhi should look outward and sideways. Europe, Japan Brazil and ASEAN are no longer passive spectators in global politics. Each of these actors hold growing influence whether in trade, technology, or the climate transition.

Taking into account the recent developments, India must fast-track the India-EU free trade agreement and the Investment protection agreement, which is currently back on the negotiating table.

Second, Tokyo’s long-term investments in projects like the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor and bullet train show enduring trust. Strengthening these while expanding joint R&D in clean energy and digital tech will make the partnership more strategic and self-reliant.

With Brazil, collaboration through BRICS and shared global south priorities can jointly push for fairer economic order.

And with ASEAN, India must revive its Act East policy by improving connectivity, trade links and maritime cooperation in the Indo-pacific. As ASEAN balances between the U.S and China, it values India’s neutrality and stability as well. Also, with Australia, India must secure critical minerals for its green industries and expand cooperation under the QUAD framework.

Together, such engagements can ensure that India isn’t trapped in either U.S-China rivalry or a new reviving bond, it must by all means emerge as a third pole of stability with shaping, not following this new bipolar world.

There is also a broader question: what does India’s strategic autonomy mean in this new order? It cannot simply mean staying non-aligned; it must be multi-aligned, engaging with all, dependent on none. That requires India to strengthen its indigenous defence production, invest in diplomacy that is both principled and pragmatic, and position itself as a bridge between the Global North and South.

Trump’s transactional worldview also offers India both a warning and an opening. The warning being that alliances built on convenience can quickly turn into liabilities.  While the opening is that a power still exists between the two poles, and India can fill it not as a junior ally but a pole in it’s own right.

Well, the return of Chimerica may once again define the global balance of power. But this time, India’s task is not to pick sides but to build its own.