Opinion
Tue 21 Apr
Somewhere along the way, two separate issues: delimitation and reservation, have been mixed up into one big political mess. They are not the same thing, but political tensions have tied them together, turning delimitation into a proper bone of contention and, frankly, a hot potato no one wants to handle cleanly. That said, I stand firmly in favour of the reservation itself. Women today are not waiting to “prove” anything—we already have. From STEM to farming, healthcare to business, women are everywhere, contributing, leading, building. But politics? That’s one space where entry has been slow, restricted, and often resisted. And that needs to change, urgently. The opposition has raised concerns, calling delimitation a possible political land grab and questioning whether any committee formed would favour the Centre. On the other hand, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has said the process will be guided by law and built through consensus. Both sides have their arguments, but this back-and-forth cannot become an excuse to stall women’s representation yet again.
Let’s be real, elections in India are always around the corner. If every reform waits for the “perfect timing,” or every reform becomes synonyms with electoral gain then nothing will ever get done.
There are also concerns about the expanding Parliament, whether it will become too crowded or lose the quality of debate. Fair point. Parliamentary standards must be maintained. But that cannot come at the cost of keeping women out. That argument just doesn’t hold anymore. With India’s growing population, delimitation is bound to happen. But women’s rights should not get caught in the crossfire of political calculations. Nor should this be framed as something that takes away from men as if equality is a zero-sum game. Let’s be clear: women today are not asking to filling seats for the sake of it. This is about rightful representation.
NOT A PRIVELEGE. NOTE A TOKEN. A RIGHT LONG OVERDUE AND AND IMPOSSIBLE TO IGNORE.
Uncategorized
Thu 9 Apr
There’s a phrase quietly doing the rounds: TACO — Trump Always Chickens Out. It sounds unserious, but looking at the current US–Iran ceasefire, it starts to feel like a pattern rather than a punchline.
Because after weeks of escalation, airstrikes, and threats of wider war, we are back to something very familiar, negotiations over the same issue that triggered the conflict in the first place.
And that raises a simple but uncomfortable question:
What exactly was the war for?
The United States and Israel justified their military action against Iran on one clear ground uranium enrichment. It was presented as a non-negotiable red line. Iran’s nuclear programme was framed as a threat that had to be stopped, not discussed.
But now, after a fragile two-week ceasefire, Iran’s 10-point peace proposal is on the table and at its centre is the right to enrichment.
This is not speculation. Even within the ceasefire framework, reports suggest that the US is engaging with proposals that include sanctions relief, security guarantees, and recognition of Iran’s nuclear position.
So the contradiction is clear:
If enrichment was unacceptable before the war, how did it become negotiable after it?
This is where the idea of TACO becomes more than a joke.
Trump has not openly admitted any shift. He continues to call the ceasefire a “total victory.” But the reality is visible in the process—a move from hardline positions to flexible negotiations.
And this is not new.
The United States followed a similar path in Afghanistan—entering with absolute objectives and eventually negotiating its exit with the very forces it once refused to recognise.
The pattern is hard to ignore:
Set a strong red line- use force to enforce it – then negotiate around it.
Both sides are claiming success.
The US says military pressure forced Iran to the table.
Iran says it resisted pressure and pushed its own framework forward. Even within the ceasefire, both sides have presented the outcome as a victory to their domestic audiences.
But if you step back, the picture looks different.
Iran has not given up enrichment.
The US has not eliminated the nuclear issue.
The region remains unstable. So instead of a clear winner, what we have is a stalemate packaged as success.
What truly shaped this conflict was not just nuclear policy, but geography.
Iran’s ability to block or reopen the Strait of Hormuz became a central bargaining tool during the crisis. The ceasefire itself depended on Iran agreeing to allow safe passage of commercial shipping.
This matters because Hormuz is not just a regional route—it is a global lifeline.
And that is exactly why a Hormuz Convention is needed.
Instead of repeating cycles of escalation, a formal agreement could:
- Guarantee freedom of navigation
- Prevent the use of shipping routes as pressure tools
- Create basic rules that reduce sudden escalation
It would not solve political tensions, but it would limit how far they can spiral.
An interesting shift in this crisis has been Pakistan positioning itself as a mediator, even inviting both sides for talks in Islamabad.
This signals something important, regional actors are stepping in where global powers are struggling to create stable outcomes.
For India, this moment is critical.
India’s stakes are direct:
- Energy security depends heavily on Gulf routes
- Trade and investments, including connectivity projects with Iran
- A large diaspora across West Asia
But India’s response cannot be shaped by its rivalry with Pakistan.
This is not about competition.
This is about stability.
India must act as a regional stabiliser, not a reactive power. Because what matters here is not who mediates—but whether peace holds.
The deeper issue is not just Trump, or Iran, or even this specific conflict.
It is the cycle itself.
Threats are amplified.
Wars are justified.
And then negotiations bring everyone back to a version of the same starting point.
Each time this happens, trust weakens. Red lines lose meaning. And future conflicts become easier to trigger.
So, what did this war change?
Very little.
Iran still holds its position.
The US is still negotiating.
The core issue remains unresolved.
Which brings us back to TACO, not as an insult, but as a pattern of modern geopolitics.
If a war begins by rejecting something and ends by negotiating over it, then the real question is not who won—but why the war was needed at all.
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Opinion
Thu 13 Nov
A few weeks ago at the APEC Summit, a familiar but confusing scene returned to global politics. US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, two leaders who are rewriting the rhythm of 21st century geopolitics, shared a moment that seemed to restore the idea of a “G-2” world. Both countries quietly acknowledged each other as the ultimate arbiters of power.
It was the return of ‘Chimerica’- a term coined by historian Niall Ferguson in the late 2006 to describe the symbiotic economic relationship that had developed between the United States and China. It captured how the U.S and China became economically interdependent- America driving global consumption and China powering global production. This fusion, which gained momentum after China’s economic reforms and entry into global markets, sustained worldwide growth for decades. The U.S spent, China saved and both benefitted.
Well, it may describe their interdependent relationship but now it is a more complicated coexistence.
Just days before this diplomatic spectacle, Washington and New Delhi signed a new 10-year defence framework. The deal, covering cooperation across land, air, sea, space and cyber domains was presented as a major milestone in India-U.S ties. But beneath the optics lies a more sobering reality.
The arrangement looks like a strategic partnership and more like a buyer-seller relationship. As Trump extends a hand to Beijing while selling arms to India, it becomes clear that U.S isn’t choosing between its tow Asian priorities. It is simply keeping both in play, an act of pure diplomatic dexterity.
Today, Trump’s second presidency has revived the idea of Chimerica in a play with a harder edge. His approach toward Beijing is not one of warm cooperation but of “competitive coexistence.” His recent Asia tour spanning Japan, South Korea and ASEAN alongside his engagement with Xi, shows a shift from full confrontation to selective engagement. Washington is learning to live with China while limiting its rise.
For Asian nations, this renewed Chimerica brings as much unease as opportunity. America’s approach seems to oscillate between tariffs and handshakes, sanctions and summits.
Trump’s style may be unpredictable, but his method is consistent: deal with rivals from a position of strength, keep allies close but dependent and ensure that U.S remains the indispensable power in Asia.
India’s position becomes uniquely delicate. The new 10-year defence agreement gives New Delhi access to advanced technologies and greater interoperability with U.S forces. Yet, India must ask- is it truly a co-author of this security architecture, or merely a consumer of it?
A partnership built on purchases cannot define India’s long-term security ambitions. What New Delhi needs is capability-building, not dependency.
Moreover, as the U.S juggles its engagement with both China and India. Washington’s larger strategy appears clear- contain Beijing without losing Beijing. The goal is to maintain competition without escalation. In that balance, India becomes both a partner and a pawn.
This is where India’s own diplomacy must evolve. Instead of being trapped in the binary of the U.S-China contest, New Delhi should look outward and sideways. Europe, Japan Brazil and ASEAN are no longer passive spectators in global politics. Each of these actors hold growing influence whether in trade, technology, or the climate transition.
Taking into account the recent developments, India must fast-track the India-EU free trade agreement and the Investment protection agreement, which is currently back on the negotiating table.
Second, Tokyo’s long-term investments in projects like the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor and bullet train show enduring trust. Strengthening these while expanding joint R&D in clean energy and digital tech will make the partnership more strategic and self-reliant.
With Brazil, collaboration through BRICS and shared global south priorities can jointly push for fairer economic order.
And with ASEAN, India must revive its Act East policy by improving connectivity, trade links and maritime cooperation in the Indo-pacific. As ASEAN balances between the U.S and China, it values India’s neutrality and stability as well. Also, with Australia, India must secure critical minerals for its green industries and expand cooperation under the QUAD framework.
Together, such engagements can ensure that India isn’t trapped in either U.S-China rivalry or a new reviving bond, it must by all means emerge as a third pole of stability with shaping, not following this new bipolar world.
There is also a broader question: what does India’s strategic autonomy mean in this new order? It cannot simply mean staying non-aligned; it must be multi-aligned, engaging with all, dependent on none. That requires India to strengthen its indigenous defence production, invest in diplomacy that is both principled and pragmatic, and position itself as a bridge between the Global North and South.
Trump’s transactional worldview also offers India both a warning and an opening. The warning being that alliances built on convenience can quickly turn into liabilities. While the opening is that a power still exists between the two poles, and India can fill it not as a junior ally but a pole in it’s own right.
Well, the return of Chimerica may once again define the global balance of power. But this time, India’s task is not to pick sides but to build its own.
Opinion
Thu 13 Nov
This article has been published with: The populist America needs today
It’s not every day that a Muslim of Indian origin becomes the mayor of the world’s richest city—New York. But today, Zohran Mamdani, born in Uganda to Indian parents, raised in Queens and long seen as an outsider in American politics, pulled off what many called impossible.
In a city built by immigrants but ruled by elites, a man who once rapped about inequality and later worked as a tenant organiser fighting evictions now holds keys to the city hall.
Mamdani’s victory isn’t just his own. It’s a mirror held up to America, a country still wrestling with what it means to be “American.”
In a political landscape fractured by polarisation between the populist right and an exhausted liberal establishment, Mamdani has found resonance by talking about something both sides often forget, the cost of living. His promises of free bus rides, rent freezes, public grocery stores, and universal childcare sound almost utopian to his critics, but to many ordinary New Yorkers burdened by rent hikes and long commutes, they ring as necessary, even overdue.
For nearly a decade, political populism in the United States has worn a single face that of Donald Trump. His “America first” rhetoric, nationalist nostalgia, and resentment-driven movement have defined one half of the nation’s mood. But Mamdani’s win represents a very different kind of populism—one built not on fear and exclusion, but on empathy and inclusion.
Mamdani’s campaign wasn’t about identity politics, though identity was impossible to ignore. His very presence challenged the unspoken hierarchies of American powers. Yet, what propelled him wasn’t his biography, but his politics; one of survival.
One tells his followers that they have been robbed by outsiders, the other tells his voters that they have been forgotten by insiders. It is a subtle but radical difference, the shift from populism as protectionism to populism as participation.
That Mamdani openly identifies himself as a Democratic Socialist would have seemed unthinkable in the America of even a decade ago. Yet it reflects the slow transformation of political imagination among young voters who came at age through crisis like 9/11, 2008 financial crash and the pandemic each, chipping away at the myth that capitalism alone guarantees freedom.
Mamdani has revived socialism not as an imported ideology, but as an American inheritance rooted in the labour struggles, anti-war movements, and civil rights campaigns that have long coexisted with capitalism’s glare.
Still, his rise has unsettled many in the party. Centrists fear that his identity and socialist economics will be used by Trumpist to stoke old cultural divides ahead of the 2026 midterms. Yet the left within the party sees Mamdani what the Democrats have long lacked; moral clarity.
He talks not about “unity” as a slogan but about justice as a material condition. His message of affordability and inclusion gives populism back its original democratic meaning.
In that sense, Mamdani’s victory is less a footnote in New York’s political history than a window into America’s ideological future. It suggests that populism need not always carry the smell of nationalism. It can instead, be the language of a new social contract, one that redefines “the people” not by who they exclude, but by what they endure together.
The MAGA movement made anger the grammar of American politics. Mamdani’s populism makes solidarity it’s syntax. Both claim to speak for “the forgotten,” but only one seeks to ensure that no one is forgotten again.
Opinion
Sun 2 Nov
This article has been published with: Act east, deliver east
In the soft-lit hills of Kuala Lumpur, Southeast Asia’s leaders gathered this October to take stock of an unsettled world. The 47th ASEAN Summit hosted by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, carried both promise and paradox of Asia’s regional diplomacy.
Under the theme of “inclusivity and sustainability,” the three-day deliberation sought to reimagine Asia’s regional order, one that must now adapt to the slow erosion of multilateral trust.
Among the summit’s tangible outcomes, something became historic: Timor-Leste’s induction as ASEAN’s 11th member. The move was symbolic of ASEAN’s expanding horizons and the bloc’s continued relevance as a bridge across the Indo-pacific. Yet, amid the handshakes and declarations, the conversation in diplomatic circles revolved around the chair left empty by India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Modi’s virtual participation at the summit sparked more speculation than his speech. His absence was read not as neglect but as a strategic signal, one that left many wondering whether India, which once championed the ‘Act East’ slogan is now content to act virtually.
To his credit, Modi’s address did not lack substance. He described ASEAN as the ‘cultural capital of India,’ reiterating, during civilisational links that anchor India’s eastern outreach. He stressed that even in this “era of uncertainties,” the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership continues to serve as a foundation for global stability.
The declaration of 2026 as the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation underlined Delhi’s growing investment in maritime security, counter-piracy operations, and cyber-resilience across shared waters. These are vital for India, given that nearly 80 per cent of its energy imports flow through ASEAN-controlled routes such as the Malacca Strait.
There were other signs of progress, too. Both sides agreed to expediate the modernisation of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA), a critical move as India’s trade deficit with ASEAN has widened alarmingly, from $9.6 billion in 2016-17 to $43.5 billion in 2022-23. The India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway and Kaladan multi-modal transport project, long symbolic of India’s sluggish project diplomacy, reappeared in joint statements, this time with promises of renewed speed.
Meanwhile, digital cooperation has emerged as a new frontier. India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) has drawn admiration across ASEAN for its accessibility and reliability. The first ASEAN-India Track 1 Cyber Policy Dialogue was also welcomed, setting up structured channels for tackling cyber threats, a sign that the partnership is finally venturing into 21st century domains rather than lingering on the 20th century rhetoric.
Officially, the Ministry of External Affairs attributed PM Modi’s absence to scheduling conflicts, the Diwali season and Bihar elections.
According to Professor Rajan Kumar of Jawaharlal Nehru University, the absence might reflect unease over stalled trade negotiations with the US, especially after President Trump’s 50 per cent tariff hike on Indian imports and Washington’s sanctions on Russian firms integral to India’s energy supply. In that context, a face-to face encounter might have been diplomatically uncomfortable.
Still, India was far from absent. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar represented the country, holding substantive bilateral meetings with his Malaysian, Singaporean and Thai counterparts. Yet, the “empty chair” had its own symbolism.
In the lexicon of geopolitics, “diplomacy of presence” matters, the sheer act of being there can shape discussions, perceptions, and hierarchies. An unoccupied seat can be louder than a statement.
Well, India’s engagement with ASEAN remains one of the more consistent threads of its foreign policy. It aligns neatly with Delhi’s Act East Policy, seeking to turn India from a South Asian power into a broader Indo-Pacific actor. For ASEAN too, India offers something unique: a democratic counterweight in a region often defined by US-China contestation.
Unlike Beijing or Washington, Delhi doesn’t seek to dominate ASEAN’s decision making. Its policy supports ASEAN centrality the idea that Southeast Asia, not external partners, should lead its regional agenda. That humility has given India quiet but durable credibility within ASEAN capitals.
Yet, substance must keep peace with sentiment as well. India has been slow to deliver on infrastructure promises and trade facilitation. While projects like the Trilateral Highway remains unfinished, China’s belt and road initiative continues to reshape the region’s connectivity map.
If India wants to be seen as a reliable partner rather than a distant admirer, execution must replace declarations.
Economically, ASEAN represents India’s fourth-largest trading partner and a key pillar in its effort to diversify supply chains away from China. But to move from potential to power, India needs sustained investment, private sector push and trade predictability, not just rhetoric of friendship.
The Kuala Lumpur summit reaffirmed that ASEAN-India relations are not faltering, they are evolving sometimes unevenly, but there does exist a strategic purpose.
The shared agenda on digital finance, cybersecurity and maritime governance shows that cooperation is moving into newer, more pragmatic spaces.
However, India’s challenge is one of consistency and presence. The Indo-Pacific is not shaped only in war rooms or treaties but through the quiet choreography of constant engagement.
If India wants the 21st century to truly be the “India-ASEAN Century,” as PM Modi declared. The region is watching not just for India’s words, but for its willingness to show up consistently, credibly and confidently.
Opinion
Sat 18 Oct
This article has been published with: Why Gen Z protests are shaking the world
Unlike their predecessors, Gen Z is not content with gradual change. They have grown up in a digital world where progress is instantaneous and transparency is expected. Their protests are organised online, powered by memes, videos and digital solidarity. The internet is not just their stage; it is their weapon.
For years, the world watched the protests erupted from Hong Kong to Cairo marking 2019 as the so-called “year of protest.” But in 2025, a different kind of uprising has taken shape. This time, it is much younger, sharper, and more connected.
From Nepal to Indonesia, the Philippines to Morocco and Madagascar, a restless generation has taken to the streets, transforming frustration into defiance. Experts are calling it the wave of ‘Gen Z protests,’ and it may redefine how dissent looks in the modern age.
The sparks that ignite these protests differ from one country to another, yet the underlying fire is the same: anger over poor governance, inequality, corruption and a future that feels increasingly out of reach. In Nepal, the outrage began with a government-imposed social media ban that was quickly reversed, but not before triggering a nationwide reckoning. For a generation raised online, the ban was not just an attack on communication but a silencing of identity and expression.
It became the final straw in a long history of corruption, nepotism, and political failure. Prime Minister Oli’s resignation soon followed, exposing a deep disillusionment among young Nepalis who feel their democracy has been hijacked by the elite.
In Indonesia and the Philippines, the frustration runs parallel over widening inequality, soaring youth unemployment, and an economy that no longer guarantees dignity. Many young people are working multiple low-paying jobs, watching the promise of education dissolve into a market that no longer rewards effort.
A recent World Bank update highlights that one in seven people in China and Indonesia is unemployed, and that much of the region’s job creation has shifted from factories to unstable service work. The ladder that once lifted millions into the middle class has started to crack.
In Morocco, protests have flared up around social justice reforms and the state of public services. The country’s youth are furious that billions of dollars are being pushed into hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup while healthcare, education, and transport systems remain broken. To them, it is not just about sports, it is about misplaced priorities.
The glittering stadiums are being built on the back of neglect. The government’s vision of progress feels hollow when water shortages, unemployment and social inequality persist.
Across the Indian ocean, in Madagascar, young protesters are demanding something even more basic: electricity and clean water. The island nation faces an ironic dilemma, while political elites make grand promises of development, ordinary families continue to suffer from erratic power cuts and unreliable water supplies, often left in darkness and neglect.
What unites these different uprisings is not just ideology, but exhaustion, a generation that feels cheated by those who claim to lead them.
Well, it’s quite clear that this generation does not want symbolic reforms or slow-moving promises. They want results they are visible.
Unlike their predecessors, Gen Z is not content with gradual change. They have grown up in a digital world where progress is instantaneous and transparency is expected. Their protests are organised online, powered by memes, videos and digital solidarity. The internet is not just their stage; it is their weapon.
Every government scandal, every instance of elite privilege, every broken promise becomes public within seconds.
Older generations often dismiss this as performative outrage, but it is much deeper than that. For Gen Z, activism is survival. They are fighting for jobs, dignity and relevance in systems that continue to exclude them. Their rebellion is not simply about demanding reforms; it is about reclaiming agency in societies that ignore them.
In many ways Gen Z protests of 2025 are not just reactions to crisis; they are reflections of a larger global fatigue. The world has been living through years of economic uncertainty, climate anxiety and political stagnation. For young people who have inherited these challenges, protest is not a choice it has become a necessity.
What is happening in these parts of the world is not chaos, it is clarity. These protests reveal a generation that refuses to wait, one that demands accountability now, not later.
Governments can either listen or continue to pretend that stability is the same as peace. But the truth is clear: this generation is no longer asking for permission to change the world, it is already doing it.
Opinion
Mon 13 Oct
The article has been published with: As the first phase of US president Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan for Gaza gains traction, with both Hamas and Israel cautiously signing onto its initial framework, a new moment of reckoning arises not just for the region but for India, whose interests and ideals converge at the heart of Gaza’s fragile peace.
As the first phase of US president Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan for Gaza gains traction, with both Hamas and Israel cautiously signing onto its initial framework, a new moment of reckoning arises not just for the region but for India, whose interests and ideals converge at the heart of Gaza’s fragile peace.
The plan, which emphasises large-scale international investment in water, energy, health, and infrastructure, has drawn careful support from the European Union and several Arab states, including Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
While many remain concerned over the absence of a clear timeline for Israel’s withdrawal, the momentum itself is significant. Prime Minister Modi welcomed the plan as “decisive progress” and a “significant step forward,” signaling India’s willingness to see stability return to Gaza after years of destruction and despair.
For India, peace in Gaza is not an abstract moral issue but a question deeply linked to its historical diplomacy, energy security, and regional aspirations. New Delhi’s engagement with the Palestinian question predates its own independence.
In 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru ensured India’s participation in the UN Special Committee on Palestine, where India defied the Western bloc to support a single federal state with Arab and Jewish provinces, a stance consistent with its postcolonial belief in coexistence and self-determination.
In the following decades, India extended sustained financial support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and contributed troops to successive UN peacekeeping missions, including the UN Emergency Force in the Suez and Sinai, where Indian soldiers even lost their lives during the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict.
India’s solidarity with the Palestinian cause has never been merely symbolic. In 1988, it became one of the first non-Arab nations to recognise the State of Palestine, a step that many Western democracies only began contemplating decades later. Yet, the early 1990s marked a recalibration. When India established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, it was not a repudiation of its commitment to Palestine but a response to the changing geopolitical order.
The Madrid Peace Conference has brought new players to the table, and India, wary of being excluded from the evolving peace process, adjusted its strategy to engage with both sides. Since then, India has attended donor conferences, participated in UN committees on Palestinian rights, and provided development assistance and technical training to the Palestinian Authority (PA), while simultaneously building robust defence, agricultural, and technology partnerships with Israel.
This dual approach, combining principled support for Palestinian sovereignty with pragmatic engagement with Israel, has been the defining feature of India’s Middle East policy for over three decades.
India has repeatedly condemned terrorism in all its forms, including attacks on Israeli civilians, while also expressing concern when Israel’s military operations inflict civilian suffering in Gaza. Its response to the recent conflict, particularly after the airstrikes near Doha, was carefully worded but deliberate, reiterating the need to respect international humanitarian law and resume dialogue toward a two-state solution.
At the heart of India’s interest in the new Gaza plan lies not just diplomacy but economics as well. With the Abraham Accords reshaping West Asia, India finds itself part of a new cooperative architecture that bridges both Israel and the Gulf.
The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced in 2023, exemplifies this shift, a project linking India’s ports to the Gulf, Israel, and onward to Europe through rail and maritime routes. Its success depends on regional stability.
A peaceful Gaza, integrated into a broader framework of reconstruction and trade, directly serves India’s interests in securing energy supplies, ensuring uninterrupted trade flows, and maintaining safe conditions for over eight million Indians living and working in the Gulf region, whose remittances exceed $40 billion annually.
Israel’s ambassador to India recently suggested that New Delhi should take an active role in Gaza’s reconstruction, citing India’s expertise in infrastructure, water management, and digital governance. Indian companies such as Larsen & Toubro and Tata Projects have already demonstrated their capacity to execute large-scale civil works across the Middle East.
India’s engagement in the region would not only consolidate the nation’s image as a development partner but also reinforce its credentials as a responsible power capable of constructive mediation.
Beyond economic calculations, India’s participation would resonate with its broader foreign policy doctrine, one that blends strategic autonomy with normative leadership. As a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, India has historically positioned itself as a bridge between the Global North and South.
Today, that legacy continues through new minilateral groupings such as the I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, United States), which promote cooperation in food, energy, and innovation. By constructively engaging in Gaza’s recovery while upholding Palestinian sovereignty, India can project itself as a moderating force that values peace without partisanship.
However, the path ahead demands caution. Aligning too closely with the Israeli or American approach could alienate traditional Arab partners, especially those sensitive to Palestinian sovereignty.
The challenge for India, therefore, is to sustain a credible middle course one that upholds humanitarian principles while remaining anchored in realpolitik.
In Gaza’s fragile future, India’s role could go beyond financial assistance. Its record in peacekeeping, institution building, and capacity training makes it uniquely positioned to help restore basic governance, healthcare, and education systems.
Indian NGOs and development agencies, working alongside UN bodies, could contribute to skill-building programmes that empower Palestinian youth and reduce dependence on aid.
From Nehru’s moral idealism to Modi’s pragmatic outreach, India’s policy on Palestine and Israel has been marked by adaptation without abandonment. The new Gaza peace plan presents yet another test of that balance.
Whether India chooses to remain a cautious observer or an active participant in reconstruction will reveal how it defines power in the twenty-first century.
Opinion
Fri 3 Oct
This article has been published with: Rethinking free speech through Sahyog
Sahyog can serve public good but only if backed by transparency, statutory clarity and judicial review. Otherwise, it will remain a contested experiment seen by some as shield against cybercrime and by others as a step toward state overreach.
From the very beginning, India’s free speech story has been a push and pull between expansive liberty and cautious regulation. When the framers of India’s Constitution enshrined freedom of speech and expression in Article 19(1)(a), they understood that democracy thrives on debate, disagreement and dissent. Yet they built in caveats; Article 19(2) that permits the State to impose “reasonable restrictions” in the interests of sovereignty, public order, morality and security.
In this regard, the Supreme Court has often stepped in. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950), it struck down a ban on a political journal, declaring that freedom of speech lay “at the foundation of all democratic organisation.” In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), it famously scrapped Section 66A of the IT Act, holding that vague powers to police online speech violated constitutional guarantees.
Time and again, the judiciary has stressed: restrictions must be narrowly tailored, reasoned and subject to oversight. Which brings us today to the Sahyog portal. Launched by the Union IT Ministry last year, it is a centralised digital platform through which government agencies and police can issue takedown requests to social media intermediaries. Officially designed to combat cybercrime and harmful online content, it allows authorities to flag and demand removal of posts directly.
The controversy arises because critics argue that the portal bypasses the safeguards of Section 69A, operates in secrecy and risks enabling censorship.
Yet, in a recent ruling, the Karnataka High Court took a different view: it upheld the government’s use of this digital tool, dismissing X Corporation’s plea that labelled the system “extra-legal censorship”, and instead described the portal as “an instrument of public good” and a “beacon of cooperation” against online harms, and that it is a cooperative mechanism to tackle cybercrime.
Soon after, Elon Musk’s company declared it was “deeply concerned,” warning that Sahyog allows millions of officers to demand removals in secrecy, bypassing safeguards of Section 69A, infringing on constitutional rights.
So, is this really censorship?
Supporters say this is not an arbitrary censorship but enforcement. The internet is flooded with deepfakes, child exploitation material, hate campaigns and frauds. Harm spreads at the speed of a click, while legal blocking orders often take weeks. A centralised portal, they argue, makes cooperation efficient, protects victims swiftly and reflects the State’s duty to maintain public order.
Seen in this light, Sahyog is a policing tool against criminal misuse not a muzzle on political dissent.
The high court’s view fits this reasoning: challenging the portal is, in its words to ‘misunderstand its very purpose.’
Yet critics, civil society, legal scholars and X see danger in how Sahyog operates. Unlike Section 69A, which requires reasoned, reviewable orders, Sahyog enables opaque takedown requests. No public record, no notice to users, no guaranteed oversight. This, they argue is ‘arbitrary censorship,’ not in its declared intent, but in its unchecked potential.
The real threat is that an officer in one corner of the country could order content down in another, with the citizen left unaware of the grounds. Genuine dissent or inconvenient reporting may vanish under the same framework meant to remove harmful content. When removals happen without transparency, it often seems as silencing even if done unintentionally.
Well, censorship is not always about intent, but also about a process. A system that removes content without reasoned orders, without notice, and without accountability resembles censorship in practice, even if born of noble objectives. Sahyog, as currently designed, can risks blurring that line.
The government insists that “the Constitution wins.” Musk insists that free expression is under threat. The truth lies in neither extreme. Sahyog can serve public good but only if backed by transparency, statutory clarity and judicial review. Otherwise, it will remain a contested experiment seen by some as shield against cybercrime and by others as a step toward state overreach.
India’s constitutional journey has always been about negotiating liberty and restraint. Whether Sahyog becomes a cooperative safeguard or a creeping censor will depend less on its technology, and more on how faithfully it is made to follow the spirit of Article 19.
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